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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
ANTITRUST PROCEDURES AND
PENALTIES ACT OF 1974 TO
VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS
In 1974, Congress passed the Antitrust Procedures and Penal-
ties Act (APPA),1 providing for judicial review of proposed con-
sent decree settlements2 in public, civil antitrust actions.3 Con-
sent decrees have been a valuable enforcement technique for the
Justice Department-between 1955 and 1974, the Antitrust Di-
vision terminated approximately eighty percent of its complaints
with consent decree settlements. Reacting to several improper
consent decrees in the past, particularly the controversial settle-
ment of antitrust cases against the International Telephone and
Telegraph (ITT) corporation in 1971,1 Congress attempted to
1. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h)(1982). The APPA is popularly known as the Tunney Act.
2. An antitrust consent decree settlement is an "order of the court agreed upon by
representatives of the Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the con-
duct challenged by the Attorney General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, or related statutes." REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. ix (1959)[hereinafter cited as 1959 H.R. REP.]. See generally M. Goldberg, The
Consent Decree: Its Formulation and Use (Occasional Paper No. 8, Bureau of Bus. &
Econ. Research, Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Mich. St. U., 1962); Kalodner, Consent
Decrees as an Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 ANTrrhusT BULL. 277 (1978); Note, The
Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1314 (1959).
3.
Any proposal for a consent judgment submitted by the United States for entry
in any civil proceeding ... under the antitrust laws shall be filed with the dis-
trict court before which such proceeding is pending and published by the United
States in the Federal Register at least 60 days prior to the effective date of such
judgment.
15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1982). Because the APPA applies only to public antitrust actions
brought in the name of the United States, it does not apply to suits brought by the
Federal Trade Commission. Interview with Julian Buenger, former Federal Trade Com-
mission trial-attorney, in Dallas, Texas (Aug. 5, 1985).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6535, 6536 [hereinafter cited as 1974 H.R. REP.]. See also S. REP.
No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973)[hereinafter cited as 1973 S. REP.]. For a list of the
annual percentage of antitrust judgments represented by consent decrees between 1955
and 1972, see 119 CONG. REC. 24,600 (1973) (statement of Sen. Gurney).
5. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (Hartford), 1971 Trade Cas.
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prevent future abuses through the reform of government anti-
trust enforcement procedures.' The APPA was designed to in-
crease public awareness and participation in these procedures,7
and provide a greater degree of judicial control over the consent
decree process.
The APPA requires, prior to the entry of a proposed consent
decree as a judgment,9 a determination by the district court that
the consent decree is in the public interest.10 The Act provides
discretionary standards11 and procedures" to facilitate this de-
(CCH) 909,766 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. (Can-
teen), 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 90,530 (N.D. Ill. 1971); United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp. (Grinnell), 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970). ITT was forced to divest
the Canteen and Grinnell corporations, but was allowed to retain its most profitable and
liquid subsidiary, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company. There were allegations that the
Justice Department agreed to settle with ITT in exchange for the corporation's financial
backing of the 1972 Republican National Convention. See Note, The ITT Dividend: Re-
form of Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 594, 604-
05 (1973). Without reaching the merits of these allegations, a federal district court re-
fused to set aside the consent decree on the basis of fraud. United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Nader v. United
States, 410 U.S. 919 (1973). The link between the ITT settlement and the APPA can be
seen at 119 CONG. REc. 24,598 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
6. Senator Tunney, the APPA's sponsor, cited several "blatantly inequitable and im-
proper antitrust settlements" of the past, and then explained that the provisions of his
bill would "change certain specifics in the manner in which consent decrees in civil anti-
trust cases are formulated ..... 119 CONG. Rac. 24,598 (1973) (remarks of Sen.
Tunney).
7. The APPA provides for public notice and comment procedures relating to pro-
posed consent decree settlements. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
8. The APPA provides for judicial review procedures relating to proposed consent
decree settlements. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
9.
[A] consent decree, once it has been accepted by a court, has the same legal
effect as a judgment in a fully litigated action. After entry, the legal effect of an
antitrust consent decree on the rights of the parties, including the rights of the
Government, are adjudicatory rather than contractual in nature.
1959 H.R. RaEj., supra note 2, at 2-3. See also United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S.
673, 681 (1972).
10. "Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this
section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public inter-
est." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1982).
11.
For the purpose of such determination, the court may consider-
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of
alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration
of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually con-
sidered, and any other considerations bearing upon the adequacy of
such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the
complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be de-
rived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1982).
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termination. The American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
(AT&T) divestiture demonstrates the APPA's significant poten-
tial for affecting the substantive terms of a consent decree
settlement."
12. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(1982), entitled "Procedure for public interest determination,"
reads:
In making its determination under subsection (e) of this section, the court
may-
(1) take testimony of Government officials or experts or such other ex-
pert witnesses, upon motion of any party or participant or upon its own
motion, as the court may deem appropriate;
(2) appoint a special master and such outside consultants or expert wit-
nesses as the court may deem appropriate; and request and obtain the
views, evaluations, or advice of any individual, group or agency of gov-
ernment with respect to any aspects of the proposed judgment or the
effect of such judgment, in such manner as the court deems appropriate;
(3) authorize full or limited participation in proceedings before the court
by interested persons or agencies, including appearance amicus curiae,
intervention as a party pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, examination of witnesses or documentary materials, or participa-
tion in any other manner and extent which serves the public interest as
the court may deem appropriate;
(4) review any comments including any objections filed with the United
States under subsection (d) of this section concerning the proposed
judgment and the responses of the United States to such comments and
objections; and
(5) take such other action in the public interest as the court may deem
appropriate.
13. District Court Judge Harold H. Greene closely scrutinized the proposed terms of
the AT&T consent decree. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub noma. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
Judge Greene refused to "unquestioningly accept a proffered decree as long as it some-
how, and however inadequately, [dealt] with the antitrust and other public policy
problems implicated in the lawsuit." 552 F. Supp. at 151. Instead, Judge Greene indi-
cated that a decree must satisfy "the requirements for an antitrust remedy-that is, if it
effectively opens the relevant markets to competition and prevents the recurrence of an-
ticompetitive activity, all without imposing undue and unnecessary burdens upon other
aspects of the public interest-[a decree] will be approved." Id. at 153. This independent
public interest inquiry sharply contrasts with the passive standard of review employed
by most courts under the APPA. Most courts have been highly deferential to the Justice
Department when reviewing proposed settlement terms, approving decrees upon a show-
ing of good faith and the absence of prosecutorial corruption. See, e.g., United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United
States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-42 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United
States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 42 (W.D. Mo. 1975), afl'd, 534
F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). The proper scope of judicial review
of consent decrees under the APPA has been a controversial issue in the literature. Com-
pare Note, Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Reconciling Judicial Respon-
sibility With Executive Discretion, 35 HASTINas L.J. 133 (1983)(recommending a defer-
ential standard) with Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MICH. L. REv. 153 (1983)(recom-
mending an independent standard) [hereinafter cited as Note, Scope of Judicial Review
of Consent Decrees]. The scope of judicial review of consent decrees prior to the APPA
is discussed infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
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The APPA's applicability to cases voluntarily dismissed by
the Antitrust Division, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)," has recently been a topic of both antitrust literature15
and congressional hearings.16 Recent case law suggesting that the
APPA does not apply to voluntary dismissals has engendered
this debate. On the same day it filed its AT&T consent decree
settlement, and after thirteen years of litigation, the Justice De-
partment voluntarily dismissed its antitrust case against the In-
ternational Business Machines (IBM) corporation.17  Two
months later, the Antitrust Division similarly dismissed its case
against Mercedes-Benz of North America. 8 Because of Rule
41(a)(1)'s provision for dismissal without court approval, 9 and
the APPA's apparent inapplicability to voluntary dismissals,20
courts in both the IBM and Mercedes-Benz cases held that the
government's dismissal was effective without prior judicial re-
view procedures. 2  Both cases, despite their significant public
impact,22 escaped APPA procedures. These cases have thus
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides in part that:
[s]ubject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the
United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court
(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party
of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii)
by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action.
15. See Carr, Some Observations on the Tunney Act, 52 ANTrrRUST L. J. 953 (1984);
Lasker, The Tunney Act Revisited: The Role of the Court, 52 ANTrrUST L.J. 937 (1984);
McDavid, Sankbeil, Schmidt & Brett, Antitrust Consent Decrees: Ten Years of Experi-
ence Under the Tunney Act, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 883 (1984)[hereinafter cited as McDa-
vid]; Sullivan, Judicial Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: Questions of Power; Ques-
tions of Wisdom, 52 ANTITRuST L.J. 943 (1984).
16. Hearings on the Tunney Act Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)[hereinafter
cited as 1982 House Hearings].
17. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, § 1, at 1, col. 6. The United States filed its complaint
against IBM on January 17, 1969. In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d
591, 593 (2d Cir. 1982). For a short history of the IBM litigation, see id. at 593-97.
18. United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (mem.).
19. See supra note 14.
20. See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
21. See In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982);
United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 399, 401 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(meri.).
22. The United States sued IBM, one of the nation's largest industrial concerns, for
alleged monopolization of the market for general purpose electronic digital computer sys-
tems in violation of section two of the Sherman Act. In re International Business Ma-
chines Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1982). At the time of dismissal, IBM held a 58%
market share in the American market for mainframe computer systems. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1982, at 37, col. 2 (city ed.). The Reagan Administration estimated that the IBM
litigation, spanning nearly thirteen years, cost the government approximately $13.4 mil-
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given rise to congressional proposals to amend the APPA.25
This Note argues that Congress should amend the APPA to
require a judicial public interest determination prior to the en-
try of a voluntary dismissal in government-initiated civil anti-
trust actions. 4 Part I of this Note briefly describes the APPA
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Part II asserts
that APPA procedures do not currently apply to voluntary dis-
missals under Rule 41(a)(1). Part III concludes that the pur-
poses underlying the APPA and general policy considerations
support the legislative extension of the Act to dismissals. Part
IV responds to objections to this proposal. Finally, Part V
presents a specific amendment to the APPA and examines re-
cent congressional proposals.
lion. Id. at 1, col. 5. The case was described by one judge in 1980 as "tortuously long and
... costing taxpayers of the United States as well as the stockholders of IBM untold
millions of dollars, to say nothing of the continuing toll of time and effort made upon the
federal judiciary .... " In re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 925
(2d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
In the Mercedes-Benz case, the United States alleged an illegal tying arrangement
based on the defendant's dealer agreements with its four hundred domestic dealers.
United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The
defendant required each dealer to purchase all of its replacement parts from Mercedes-
Benz of North America (MBNA) itself, thus foreclosing other competitors from this
"aftermarket." Id. at 1373-74. By 1979, MBNA had sold $110 million of these parts to its
dealers, at prices that dealers described as "consistently higher than parts from other
sources." Id. at 1385. The Mercedes-Benz case was filed on August 15, 1979, United
States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. No. C-79-2144 MHP (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 15,
1979), and therefore required much less public investment than did the IBM case. Nev-
ertheless, the dismissal created controversy because the government had already proven
two-thirds of the allegations in the complaint. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 65
(statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group). Indeed, less
than a year before the case was dismissed, the court that considered both parties' mo-
tions for summary judgment found that the defendant was tying together its automobiles
and replacement parts through its dealer agreements, and that this tie-in affected a not
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce. 517 F. Supp. at 1391.
23. H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 869 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. 22441; H.R. 6361, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in
1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 4-12 [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6361].
24. This Note considers only civil actions brought by the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and focuses solely on the public interest provisions of the APPA,
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f)(1982). Extension of other APPA sections is not directly considered.
In addition, for the purposes of the major thesis, this Note does not distinguish between
voluntary dismissals by notice and those by stipulation. See infra text accompanying
notes 44-47.
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I. DESCRIPTION OF THE APPA AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 41(a)(1)
A. The APPA
The APPA is largely a procedural statute.2 5 It attempts to ex-
pose to public and judicial scrutiny the settlement procedures
taking place between the government and private attorneys.
26 It
requires the Antitrust Division to file consent decree proposals
with the district court where the case is pending.27 It also re-
quires the government to publish the proposal's terms in the
Federal Register sixty days prior to its effective date.2a Public
comments concerning the proposed settlement are filed with the
district court and published in the Federal Register, 29 along with
the government's responses to such comments. A list of the
documents that were important in the negotiation of the consent
decree, as well as a description of all written and oral communi-
cations between the government and each defendant regarding
the settlement, is filed with the district court and made available
to the public.3 1 The Antitrust Division must also file with the
court, and publish in the Federal Register, a competitive impact
statement-a summary of the litigation and the likely competi-
tive effects of the proposed settlement.3 2 The terms of the settle-
25. The APPA's "substantive effect" is considered infra notes 94-106 and accompa-
nying text.
26. See 119 CONG. REc. 24,598 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Tunney): "[The APPA] would
transform a procedure which was generally accomplished in a series of private, informal
negotiations between antitrust lawyers and attorneys for the defendant, into one that is
exposed to the full light of public awareness and judicial scrutiny."
27. See supra note 3.
28. See supra note 3.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1982). See infra note 30.
30. Id. § 16(d). These notice and comment provisions were a codification of 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.1 (1973), which was promulgated by the Justice Department following a 1959 con-
gressional investigation into alleged improprieties in the entry of the 1956 consent decree
against Western Electric. 1959 H.R. REP., supra note 2.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b), (g)(1982).
32. Id. § 16(b), which reads in part:
Simultaneously with the filing of such proposal, unless otherwise instructed by
the court, the United States shall file with the district court, publish in the Fed-
eral Register, and thereafter furnish to any person upon request, a competitive
impact statement which shall recite-
(1) the nature and purpose of the proceeding;
(2) a description of the practices or events giving rise to the alleged vio-
lation of the antitrust laws;
(3) an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment, including an
explanation of any unusual circumstances giving rise to such proposal or
[VOL. 19:1
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ment and the competitive impact statement are then published
in newspapers of general circulation in the district where the
case is pending and in the District of Columbia.33
In addition to these procedural provisions, the APPA requires
a substantive determination by the district court that the entry
of a consent decree is in the public interest .3  Although Congress
left the definition of the "public interest" to judicial construc-
tion on a case-by-case basis, 36 the statute does provide factors to
facilitate the court's determination. The court may take into ac-
count both the strictly competitive effects of the decree 36 and
the general impact of the proposal on the public.37 Relevant fac-
any provision contained therein, relief to be obtained thereby, and the
anticipated effects on competition of such relief;
(4) the remedies available to potential private plaintiffs damaged by the
alleged violation in the event that such proposal for the consent judg-
ment is entered in such proceeding;
(5) a description of the procedures available for modification of such
proposal; and
(6) a description and evaluation of alternatives to such proposal actually
considered by the United States.
33. Id. § 16(c).
34. Id. § 16(e), supra notes 10-11.
35. See 1974 H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, at 6535, 6542:
As originally expressed [in the bill], district courts were charged with determin-
ing that the entry of a proposal for a consent judgment was "in the public inter-
est as defined by law." The four words, "as defined by law" were deleted: as a
recognition that the content of the phrase, "public interest," is a product of judi-
cal [sic] construction in the context of particular statutes, as evidenced by the
lack of definition of the "public interest" in legal dictionaries and encyclopedias;
to clarify the intention not to change case law construing the "public interest" in
cases involving the antitrust laws or antitrust provisions of other laws; and to
provide illumination and consistency in the usage of the phrase, the "public in-
terest," in section 2(f)(5) of the bill. Preservation of antitrust precedent rather
than innovation in the usage of the phrase, "public interest," is, therefore,
unambiguous.
This Note similarly leaves the definition of the "public interest" in voluntary dismissals
to judicial construction on a case-by-case basis, with particular focus on three factors:
the sufficiency of evidence against a defendant, the available enforcement resources of
the Antitrust Division, and the overall public impact of the defendant's alleged antitrust
violations. See infra Part V.
36. See supra note 11. The factors listed in 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(1982) reflect the
information provided by the United States in the competitive impact statement. See
supra note 32. The House Judiciary Committee replaced the word "public" in the phrase
"public impact statement" with the word "competitive" because "(a) the antitrust laws
protect and promote competition; (b) the expertise the Antitrust Division is charged by
the Congress with institutionalizing focuses on 'competitive' effects. ... 1974 H.R.
REP., supra note 4, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6535, 6542.
This explanation apparently reflects the congressional intent to evaluate proposed con-
sent decree settlements, in part, based on whether they are "in the public interest as
expressed by the antitrust laws." 1973 S. REP., supra note 4, at 4.
37. See supra note 11. These factors were included so that "in addition to weighing
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tors include the adequacy of relief, provisions for enforcement,
and the potential benefit of a determination of the issues at
trial."8 If the court finds that the consent decree is not in the
public interest, it may refuse to enter the decree as a judgment
and force the parties to renegotiate.3 9
The court may use a variety of methods to obtain sufficient
information upon which to base its public interest determina-
tion.40 These include expert testimony, the appointment of a
special master, and amicus curiae participation. 41 The court may
also take other action in the public interest that it deems
appropriate.4"
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)4" provides two meth-
ods for a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss a case without court ap-
proval. The first, dismissal by notice, requires a plaintiff to file a
notice of dismissal prior to a defendant's answer or motion for
summary judgment, whichever occurs first.44 The second, dismis-
sal by stipulation, requires a stipulation of dismissal signed by
each party in the action.'5 Stipulations of dismissal may be filed
with the district court at any time in the litigation.4 ' Both the
dismissal by notice and the dismissal by stipulation typically op-
erate as dismissals without prejudice, allowing a plaintiff to sub-
sequently reinstate an action.47 If a plaintiff fails to meet the
the merits of [a] decree from the viewpoint of the relief obtained thereby and its ade-
quacy, [a court would also consider] the effect of entry of the decree upon private parties
aggrieved by the alleged violation and upon the enforcement of the antitrust laws gener-
ally." 118 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1972).
38. Resolution of the disputed issues at a government trial is particularly important
for subsequent private plaintiffs suing the same defendant. See infra notes 151-53 and
accompanying text. See also 118 CONG REc. 31,675 (1972) (Senator Tunney suggesting
that the public interest would be served by litigating a government case if it presented
potential precedential value, or if the government was the only party with sufficient re-
sources to litigate a case to judgment).
39. In the AT&T divestiture, Judge Greene refused to enter the proposed consent
decree unless the parties agreed to incorporate several modifications into the settlement.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 225-26 (D.D.C. 1982).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(1982), supra note 12.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(1)-(3)(1982), supra note 12.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(5)(1982), supra note 12.
43. See supra note 14.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2363, at 159
(1971).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides, in part:
[VOL. 19:1
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requirements of Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be voluntarily dis-
missed only by court order under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 41(a)(2).4 8
Rule 41(a)(1) has three exceptions. First, Rule 23(e) requires
court approval of all dismissal proposals in class action suits.49
Second, Rule 66 requires judicial approval of dismissals in ac-
tions with court appointed receivers.5 Third, the provisions of
Rule 41(a)(1) are subject to federal statutes that provide for
court approval of voluntary dismissals.5 1 Currently, there are
two such statutory exemptions, in the areas of regulation of
aliens and actions for false claims.2
II. THE APPA DOES NOT CURRENTLY APPLY TO VOLUNTARY
DISMISSALS
As originally enacted, the APPA does not apply to voluntary
dismissals. The APPA is not a statutory exemption to Rule
41(a)(1), 53 and the Antitrust Division may dismiss cases without
prior judicial approval. This is apparent from the statutory lan-
guage of the APPA, its legislative history, and recent case law on
this issue.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal [under Rule 41(a)(1)] oper-
ates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or
including the same claim.
This exception is known as the "two-dismissal" rule. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 46, § 2368, at 187.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) provides, in part: "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of
this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper."
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) states: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 66 reads, in part: "An action wherein a receiver has been ap-
pointed shall not be dismissed except by order of the court."
51. See supra note 14.
52. 8 U.S.C § 1329 (1982), a statute regulating the entry of aliens into the United
States, provides that "[n]o suit or proceeding for a violation of any of the provisions of
this subchapter shall be settled, compromised, or discontinued without the consent of
the court in which it is pending and any such settlement, compromise, or discontinuance
shall be entered of record with the reasons therefor." (emphasis added). Similarly, 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)(1982), which allows private parties to bring civil actions in the name
of the government for false claims, provides that "[ain action may be dismissed only if
the court and the Attorney General give written consent and their reasons for con-
senting." (emphasis added).
53. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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A. Language of the APPA
To interpret the APPA's applicability to voluntary dismissals,
analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself.54 The
language of the Act refers solely to consent decrees and does not
mention dismissals.5 5 Despite the canon of construction that re-
medial legislation should be broadly interpreted to effectuate its
purposes," the fact that the two current statutory exemptions to
Rule 41(a)(1) explicitly mention dismissals57 demonstrates the
significance of the lack of similar language in the APPA. With-
out a clear legislative intent to apply the Act to voluntary dis-
missals, the absence of such language "must ordinarily be re-
garded as conclusive." 58 The legislative history of the APPA
must therefore be examined.
B. Legislative History of the APPA
The APPA's legislative history clearly indicates Congress's in-
tent to restrict the scope of the Act to consent decree settle-
ments. Because of their significance as an enforcement tool for
the Antitrust Division, 9 consent decrees were the major focus of
reform in 1974. The legislative history repeatedly refers to con-
sent decrees and their importance and never implies that the
proposed Act would apply to voluntary dismissals.6 0 In fact, Sen-
54. "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
55. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 10, 11, 12, & 32.
56. "[Wle are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes." Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The fact that the statute explicitly refers only to con-
sent judgments does not a fortiori exclude its applicability to dismissals:
A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy of the
law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most likely to
occur in the mind . . . .The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a
statute . . . may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of
duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said
it, and therefore we shall go on as before.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235 (1941)(quoting Johnson v. United States,
163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)). In particular, the antitrust laws should be interpreted by
looking to more than the literal meaning of their words. Cf. United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
57. See supra note 52.
58. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
60. 1974 H.R. REP., 1973 S. REP., supra note 4. See also Consent Decree Bills: Hear-
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ator Tunney, the sponsor of the APPA, testified during congres-
sional hearings that the proposed bill would not apply to volun-
tary dismissals."1 In addition, the rejection of an earlier bill that
would have applied the Act's procedural requirements to dismis-
sals6 2 strongly suggests that Congress did not intend such a re-
sult. 3 Both the language of the APPA itself and its legislative
history therefore demonstrate the Act's inapplicability to volun-
tary dismissals.
C. Case Law
Recent case law also indicates that the APPA does not apply
to dismissals. In both In re International Business Machines
Corp.64 and United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,
Inc.," the courts held that APPA procedures did not apply to
the government's dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)." Both courts
relied primarily on the language of the APPA and its legislative
history.
6 7
The Mercedes-Benz court did, however, assert a limited judi-
cial role in cases of dismissal. Apart from any statutory author-
ity, it cited the "inherent power"" of the federal courts to look
ings on H.R. 9203, H.R. 9947, and S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)[hereinafter
cited as 1973 House Hearings]; Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S.
782 and S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)[hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings].
61. Senator Tunney, in response to whether any out of court agreement would not be
subject to judicial review under the proposed bill, stated, "I suppose the Justice Depart-
ment could drop the suit .... Otherwise the Justice Department could proceed with the
litigation or come in with a new consent [decree] and attempt to get the judge's approval
of that decree." 1973 House Hearings, supra note 60, at 43 (emphasis added).
62. Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) introduced legislation similar to the APPA that
would have been applicable to "any proposed consent judgment [or] decree or other set-
tlement of any suit . . . arising under the antitrust laws . S. 1088, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 6446-47 (1973)(emphasis added).
63. Such a rejection "strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a
result that it expressly declined to enact." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S.
186, 200 (1974).
64. 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. 547 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
66. 687 F.2d at 603; 547 F. Supp. at 401.
67. 687 F.2d at 600-03; 547 F. Supp. at 400-01.
68. "It is fundamental that federal courts have inherent power to 'prevent abuse,
oppression, and injustice. . . as extensive and efficient as may be required by the neces-
sity for their exercise and [it] may be invoked by strangers to the litigation' or sua
sponte." 547 F. Supp. at 400 (quoting Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888)). Cf.
Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1974) (setting aside an order
of discontinuance where client sought to reinstate case which had been dismissed by
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behind stipulations of dismissal for possible collusion between
the parties."9 After requiring both parties to certify to the court
that no secret deal or agreement existed between them, the
court concluded that no such collusion existed.70 Yet because the
APPA did not apply, this inquiry into possible collusion consti-
tuted the full extent of the court's review of the stipulation of
dismissal.
United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.71
seems to suggest that APPA procedures do apply to dismissals,
but it is not strong precedent for this suggestion. Judge Greene
stated in a footnote that all major antitrust actions, whether set-
tled or dismissed, should be evaluated under APPA proce-
dures.72 Yet this language is mere dicta because the court did
not technically rule on the applicability of the APPA-instead,
both parties agreed to comply with the procedures.73 In addition,
this case did not involve a stipulation of dismissal, but rather
involved the proposed consent decree defining the AT&T divest-
iture. The parties had initially characterized their settlement
proposal as a dismissal,74 but Judge Greene criticized this as a
attorney).
69. "[Ilt is appropriate and within this court's power to look behind the stipulated
dismissal to determine whether there is any settlement, agreement, or understanding be-
tween the parties." 547 F. Supp. at 400.
70. The court gave no indication of any independent investigation, stating merely
that "[tihe parties have filed certificates and satisfied this court that there are no such
agreements." Id.
71. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afl'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
72.
[W]hile Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) provides that the parties may file a dismissal
without leave of court under certain circumstances, this may not be done where
a statute provides otherwise. In the view of the Court, the Tunney Act is just
such a statute.
• . . Whatever may be the proper rule in other circumstances-a matter on
which the Court expresses no opinion-at least when the dismissal of a major
antitrust action has substantive aspects or is so closely tied to a 'modification' of
another decree as is the case here, Tunney Act procedures apply.
552 F. Supp. at 144 n.52.
73.
[T]he parties have now stated. . . that, irrespective of their opinion of the tech-
nical applicability of the Tunney Act, they are willing to have the Tunney Act
procedures applied by this Court. In view of those representations, it became
unnecessary for the Court to pass specifically upon the technical applicability of
the Act.
Id. at 145 (footnotes omitted). It should be noted, however, that the court had previously
"ordered that procedures equivalent to those required by the Tunney Act be applied to
the consolidated actions." 552 F. Supp. at 143.
74. The government and AT&T initially filed a modification of the 1956 consent
judgment against Western Electric and AT&T in the District Court of New Jersey, Civil
Action No. 17-49, and a dismissal of the AT&T litigation in the District of Columbia. Id.
at 144. For a summary of both cases, see id. at 135-47.
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"mere act of labelling" 71 and proceeded to evaluate the public
interest impact of the divestiture under APPA procedures.
Therefore, despite Judge Greene's refusal to give the initial stip-
ulation of dismissal immediate effect,7s he did not exceed the
"inherent powers" limitation of Mercedes-Benz.
This inherent power to look for collusion between the parties
therefore represents the full extent of judicial review over the
Antitrust Division's decisions to dismiss cases. The case law in-
terpreting the APPA, as well as the statutory language and legis-
lative history of the APPA, clearly demonstrates that the APPA
does not currently apply to voluntary dismissals.
75. Judge Greene stated:
In the opinion of this Court, [the reasoning of the parties] may most charitably
be described as disingenuous. If that reasoning were deemed acceptable, the par-
ties here-and in similar antitrust actions-could subvert the clearly expressed
will of Congress by a mere act of labelling. The Tunney Act was designed to
expose to public scrutiny and to a judicial public interest determination the set-
tlements negotiated between the Department of Justice and the various anti-
trust defendants. The instant agreement, whatever the label the parties chose to
affix, settled two such lawsuits. That settlement, moreover, not only disposed of
what is the largest and most complex antitrust action brought since the enact-
ment of the Tunney Act but the settlement itself [also] raises what may well be
an unprecedented number of public interest questions of concern to a very large
number of interested persons and organizations. . . . As the Court made clear
from the very day the settlement was announced, it was not and is not prepared
to allow this circumvention of the congressional purpose.
Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 144 n.52. Judge Greene apparently refused to dismiss the case in order to
persuade both parties to comply with APPA procedures. After oral arguments on the
issue, he stated:
I will temporarily retain the status quo. The trial will remain in recess. The
dismissal notice will remain lodged, not filed, and the case is not at this time
dismissed.
The parties should advise me not later than next Monday whether their settle-
ment is being submitted here for application of the Tunney Act procedures. If
that is not done, I will ask the parties for briefing and I will make a formal
decision at that time, both on the right to dismissal without leave of Court, and
on the application of the Tunney Act.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,465 (D.D.C.
Jan. 12, 1982), at 72,611.
77. This notion is supported by a subsequent AT&T case, Gregg Communications
Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 98 F.R.D. 715 (N.D. 11. 1983). The Gregg case was a private action
by five competitors of AT&T in the automatic telephone answering machine market. One
of the major issues in Gregg was the effect of the government case against AT&T on the
statute of limitations for private actions. The court held that Judge Greene properly
exercised the "court's inherent powers" by refusing to immediately file the stipulation of
dismissal, and that the government case was therefore still pending until August 24,
1982. Id. at 718. Thus, the plaintiffs in Gregg were not time-barred by 15 U.S.C. § 15b
(1982). The court also specifically held that the APPA does not apply to voluntary dis-
missals. Id.
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 19:1
III. THE APPA SHOULD BE AMENDED TO APPLY TO VOLUNTARY
DISMISSALS
Because the APPA does not currently apply to voluntary dis-
missals, Congress should amend the Act to require a judicial
public interest review prior to the entry of a voluntary dismissal
in government-initiated civil antitrust actions. 78 Such a require-
ment would be consistent with the purposes of the APPA's pub-
lic interest provisions relating to civil antitrust settlements, and
with the purposes of judicial review procedures in criminal anti-
trust dismissals. Sound policy considerations also support such
an amendment.
A. Purposes of the APPA's Public Interest Provisions Apply
to Voluntary Dismissals
In passing the APPA in 1974, Congress attempted to increase
the role of the judiciary in antitrust enforcement procedures by
requiring an independent public interest determination by the
district court prior to the entry of a consent decree.79 Congress
recognized the significant economic and political power of highly
concentrated industries8" and the increasing importance of the
antitrust laws,81 and sought to protect the public interest
through the reform of existing enforcement procedures.8 2 The
environment of "secrecy"83 in which parties negotiated consent
78. This Note argues only for the application of 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)-(f)(1982) to volun-
tary dismissals, as described in Part V; it does not advocate extensions of, or changes in,
any other section of the APPA.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1982), supra notes 10-11.
80. "By definition, antitrust violators wield great influence and economic power.
They often bring significant pressure to bear on government, and even on the courts, in
connection with the handling of consent decrees. The public is properly concerned
whether such pressure results in settlements which might shortchange the public inter-
est." 1973 S. REP., supra note 4, at 5. "In short, enforcement of the antitrust laws may
have a very profound effect on the lives of every citizen . . . .But beyond the economic
effect, there is a political effect. Increasing concentration of economic power . . . carries
with it a very tangible threat of concentration of political power." 119 CONG. REc. 3451
(1973)(remarks of Sen. Tunney).
81. "[W]e have learned a great deal about the importance of the Nation's antitrust
laws in recent months . . . crystaliz[ing] the rather vague concept of antitrust into a very
tangible reality." 119 CONG. REc. 3451 (1973)(remarks of Sen. Tunney).
82. See supra note 6. See also 1974 H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6536: "Given the high rate of settlement in public anti-
trust cases, it is imperative that the integrity of and public confidence in procedures
relating to settlements via consent decree procedures be assured."
83. In introducing his bill, Senator Tunney denounced "the excessive secrecy with
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decrees and the "judicial rubber stamping" " of proposed settle-
ments by district courts were primary targets of reform. In par-
ticular, the controversial ITT settlement raised a variety of pub-
lic concerns suggesting the need for reform."'
Although Congress failed to extend the APPA's public interest
provisions to voluntary dismissals, 6 these provisions are equally
justified in such cases.8 7 The "risk of abuse"88 of antitrust en-
forcement procedures is as great in dismissals as it is in settle-
ments.8 9 The public interest impact is similar in both cases.9 0 In
fact, the justification for judicial review is stronger in cases of
dismissal, where the United States obtains no relief, than in
cases of settlement, where a portion of the relief originally
sought in the complaint is usually obtained."
Both the IBM and Mercedes-Benz courts recognized this
equally compelling public interest in cases of dismissal. Despite
ruling that the APPA does not apply to voluntary dismissals,92
both courts stated that the legislative intent and policy consider-
ations underlying the APPA did apply to dismissal cases.93
which many consent decrees have been fashioned .... ." 119 CONG. REc. 24,598
(1973)(remarks of Sen. Tunney). See also 1973 House Hearings, supra note 60, at 38
(statement of Sen. Tunney).
84. "One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill has been called 'judicial
rubber stamping' by district courts of proposals submitted by the Justice Department.
The bill resolves this area of dispute by requiring district court judges to determine that
each proposed consent judgment is in the public interest." 1974 H.R. REP., supra note 4,
at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6538. See also 119 CONG. REc.
24,598 (1973)(remarks of Sen. Tunney).
85. See supra note 5.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 53-77.
87. Congress's initial decision to exempt voluntary dismissals from the APPA merely
reflects the relative importance of consent decree settlements, see supra note 4, not the
impropriety of applying the APPA's public interest provisions to dismissals.
88. Lasker, supra note 15, at 940: "By the phrase 'risk of abuse,' I mean, of course, a
disposition which is satisfactory to the parties but against the public interest."
89. See Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 400: "The evils of secrecy and ineffective
enforcement of the antitrust laws which the bill was intended to address can arise from
any settlement of a case, regardless of its form." In recent congressional hearings, it was
noted that the risk of undue political influence is also present in cases of dismissal. "The
possibility for political abuse is at least as great in the case of dismissals. . . as in other
consensual terminations of cases." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 3 (introduc-
tion of H.R. 6361 by Chairman Rodino). See also Lasker, supra note 15, at 940.
90. The public interest questions involved in the dismissal of the IBM case, for ex-
ample, see supra note 22, were surely of the same magnitude as those involved in the
AT&T divestiture and were more important than those involved in more typical anti-
trust settlements.
91. Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 401. See also 1982 House Hearings, supra note
16, at 3.
92. 687 F.2d at 603; 547 F. Supp. at 401.
93. The IBM court admitted that "many of the considerations present which
prompted Congress to legislate in the area of consent decrees [may] also [be] present
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Some argue that the purposes behind the APPA do not apply
to voluntary dismissals because the APPA is merely a proce-
dural statute. Prior to the APPA, the entry of a consent decree
was considered a judicial act requiring the court's approval.9"
Some courts, in evaluating proposed settlement terms, went be-
yond the recommendations of the Justice Department and inde-
pendently determined their public interest impact.9 5 Therefore,
the legislative history suggests that the APPA is merely "proce-
dural"-that it does not expand the judicial review power over
consent decrees, but simply ensures that judges take seriously
their existing obligations.9 6 Some argue, therefore, that any ap-
plication of the APPA's public interest provisions to dismissals
would conflict with the original purposes of the Act by ex-
panding the judicial review power over dismissals. 97 The public
where dismissals are involved." In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d at
603. In the Mercedes-Benz opinion, the court stated "that in passing the APPA 'Con-
gress was concerned with protection of the public interest in settlement of antitrust ac-
tions in general' . . . . [and] that '[t~he effect and public interest is as great whether
resolved by stipulation or dismissal.'" Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 400 (quoting its
own court order of Mar. 16).
94. 1973 S. REP., supra note 4, at 5. See also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 115 (1932).
95. In United States v. Automobile Mfr. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 621 (C.D. Cal.
1969), af'd per curiam sub noma. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970),
the court considered the enforceability of the proposed decree, the extent to which re-
quested relief in the complaint was obtained, the rights of parties not before the court,
and "whether the consent decree, on the whole, [was] against the public interest." Simi-
larly, in United States v. Carter Products, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
the court evaluated the "equity" of the consent decree, balancing the benefits to the
public against the harm to a third-party opponent. In United States v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942), appeal dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943), the court
considered a motion by the government to vacate an earlier consent decree. The court
declared that
[a] consent decree. . . is a judicial act .. and, therefore, involves a determina-
tion by the [court] that it is equitable and in the public interest. The fact that
the court may consider the opinion of the Department of Justice to the same
effect does not mean that the court has abdicated its power, or failed to carry
out its responsibility, to make an independent determination of the propriety
and equity of the decree proposed by the parties ....
Id. at 655.
96. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney): "What the
Justice Department has promulgated by administrative regulation, S. 782 would codify
and ratify as the law." Similar statements appear in the 1982 House Hearings, supra
note 16, at 29-30 (statement of Asst. Att'y Gen. Lipsky).
97. See Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 401:
[T]o apply the APPA to dismissals would be to disregard the apparent under-
standing of Congress as to the then-existing judicial practice regarding consent
decrees and the effect of the changes being made. Prior to the passage of the
APPA, entry of consent decrees was already considered to be a judicial act re-
quiring the judge's approval . . . . In contrast, stipulated dismissals are ordi-
narily entered without the need for court approval. . . Congress' understanding
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interests involved in dismissal cases, it is argued, are sufficiently
protected by the inherent powers of the judiciary8 and the con-
gressional oversight function.99
There are two problems with this argument. First, although
prior to 1974 some courts did scrutinize proposed settlements
for their public interest impact, the authority for such judicial
review was uncertain. In 1961, the Supreme Court declared in
Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States e00 that "sound policy
[dictates the acceptance of a consent decree] . . . in the absence
of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance .... "e This deferen-
tial standard, adopted by the vast majority of courts,102 obvi-
ously precluded a vigorous public interest inquiry. Codification
of a public interest determination thereby expanded the role of
the judiciary allowed under Sam Fox. Because the APPA actu-
ally expanded existing judicial power over consent decrees, a
similar expansion of the judicial role in dismissals would be con-
sistent with the congressional purposes underlying the APPA.
Second, assuming that the APPA is "procedural" and did not
alter existing judicial power, the primary purpose of the Act's
public interest provisions still supports their application to vol-
untary dismissals. Congress characterized the deferential stan-
dard in reviewing consent decrees as "judicial rubber stamp-
ing," 103 and sought to increase the role of the judiciary in order
that no major changes were being made cannot be reconciled with inclusion of
dismissals within the coverage of the APPA.
98. "The concerns involving the good faith enforcement of the antitrust laws through
voluntary dismissals are adequately and constitutionally addressed by the inherent
power of the court to look behind the dismissal 'to determine whether there is collusion
or other improper conduct giving rise to the dismissal.'" McDavid, supra note 15, at 913
(quoting Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 401).
99. "[T]here exists today an effective safeguard against the possibility that the Gov-
ernment may be less than candid in such explanations, a safeguard that does not place
the Judiciary in the position of having to oversee prosecutorial decisionmaking. This...
is close congressional scrutiny in the context of public hearings." 1982 House Hearings,
supra note 16, at 38 (statement of Asst. Att'y Gen. Lipsky).
100. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
101. Id. at 689.
102. See, e.g., United States v. First National Bank of Lexington, 280 F. Supp. 260,
263 (E.D. Ky. 1967)(entering a consent decree despite "ninety percent capitulation" by
the government), aff'd sub nom. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469
(1968) (per curiam); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 186 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Pa.),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 364 U.S.
518 (1960); United States v. General Electric Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950). See also
119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973): "[Too often in the past district courts have viewed their
[roles] as simply ministerial in nature-leaving to the Justice Department the role of
determining the adequacy of the judgment from the public's view." (remarks of Sen.
Tunney).
103. See supra note 84.
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to avoid "blatantly inequitable and improper" 10' settlements in
the future. Whatever the legal scope of judicial review prior to
the APPA, the Act sought to increase the actual scope by re-
quiring an independent public interest determination by the dis-
trict court. 10 5 This judicial independence was considered neces-
sary to adequately protect the public interest; existing
procedures were considered insufficient. Because existing judi-
cial and legislative procedures are insufficient to protect the
public interests involved in dismissal cases,106 a similar increase
in the role of the judiciary in dismissals is justified. Application
of the APPA's public interest provisions to voluntary dismissals
is consistent with the purposes of the Act.
B. Public Policy Considerations
Paralleling the pre-APPA concerns regarding improper con-
sent decree settlements, there is concern today that existing pro-
cedures regarding voluntary dismissals do not sufficiently pro-
tect the public interest.10 7 First, the congressional oversight
function, although used in the past, 08 is a poor alternative to
judicial review. Oversight committees operate after the fact and
serious separation of powers problems may exist. 0 9 Because of
104. 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973)(statement of Sen. Tunney).
105. The legislative history is replete with examples of Congress's intent to require a
greater degree of judicial independence. See, e.g., 1973 S. REP., supra note 4, at 4: "The
first Section [of the bill] is to provide that district courts make an independent determi-
nation as to whether or not the entry of a proposed consent judgment is in the public
interest .... "; 119 CONG. REc. 3542 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney):
The mandate is a highly significant one because it states as a matter of law that
the role of the district court in a consent decree proceeding is an independent
one. The court is not to operate simply as a rubber stamp, placing an imprima-
ture [sic] upon whatever is placed before it by the parties. Rather, it has an
independent duty to assure itself that entry of the decree will serve the interests
of the public generally.
106. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
107. See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 1-2.
108. A congressional oversight committee investigated the 1956 consent decree be-
tween the United States and Western Electric. 1959 H.R. REP., supra note 2. Recent
congressional hearings on the AT&T divestiture, wherein a discussion of the IBM dis-
missal also occurred, is another example. Proposed Antitrust Settlement of U.S. v.
AT&T; Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Pro-
tection, and Finance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce and the Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)[hereinafter cited as 1982 AT&T Hearings].
109.
[The Justice Department suggests that] we can always have congressional hear-
ings, but these also are after the fact. If you are worried about separation of
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these difficulties, the Justice Department has often refused to
provide oversight committees with the requisite information for
an informed public interest judgment.110 Second, the inherent
powers of a court to look for collusion cannot protect against
improper dismissals that occur without express collusion." ' The
extremely limited review of the Mercedes-Benz court under its
inherent power"1 makes it clear that the public interest cannot
rest on such a "slender reed"' " of authority. A vigorous public
interest review by an independent judiciary more adequately
protects the public concerns involved in cases of voluntary
dismissal.
In addition, the very existence of the APPA's procedures for
judicial review of consent decrees without corresponding proce-
powers problems, I shudder to think of them in the context of a committee of
the Congress supervising the activities of the executive branch in connection
with specific litigation.
1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 48 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director,
Public Citizen Litigation Group). The separation of powers questions arising from judi-
cial review of decisions to dismiss are discussed infra notes 176-205 and accompanying
text.
110. The 1959 House Committee, see supra note 2, at 40-42, failed to obtain certain
files of the Justice Department, despite allegations of improper negotiations between the
government and Western Electric. Note, supra note 5, at 601 n.43 and accompanying
text. In addition, the 1982 joint oversight committee, see supra note 108, encountered
difficulty in obtaining information regarding the opinions of the government's trial staff
on the IBM dismissal:
Mr. Rodino: [T]he failure of the Department to make available to us through
interviews with your staff this kind of information creates a more troublesome
kind of climate in that there is a question as to whether or not the division has
been forthcoming ....
Mr. Baxter: I certainly agree . . . that the oversight role of the committee is an
important one that must be given a great deal of weight. I feel with equal em-
phaticness [sic] that the consultative process within the division must also be
respected . . . direct interviews of the career staff. . . or the surrender of docu-
ments which constitute advice to me within the Antitrust Division would not be
consistent with departmental policy, and in my view would constitute a violation
of the separation of powers ...
1982 AT&T Hearings, supra note 108, at 117-19. Baxter indicated that he would provide
information that was screened and prepared for release and allow the committee to ques-
tion himself or another high official on the views of the trial staff. Id. Baxter took a
similar position on information resulting from meetings between the government and
IBM's trial staff. Id. at 129-30.
111. An improper dismissal may be the result of unilateral action, for example, or of
very subtle collusion between the parties. See, e.g., Hearings Pursuant to H.R. 803
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., book V, pt.1, at 311-20
(1974), for conversations between President Nixon and his advisors on the ITT cases.
112. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
113. Lasker, supra note 15, at 940:
In any event, it seems to me that it would be an unwise policy for courts to
attempt to extend control of consent dismissals for civil government antitrust
suits simply on the basis of inherent authority. The issue is too questionable and
the subject matter too important to rest on such a slender reed.
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dures in cases of dismissal provides a "perverse incentive"11 to
circumvent the Act. If a judge refuses to enter a consent decree
and orders the Antitrust Division to bring the case to trial or
modify the settlement terms, this judicial order may currently
be circumvented through a voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a)(1)." 5 This voluntary dismissal, if not the result of express
collusion between the parties nor sufficiently controversial to at-
tract legislative attention, can take effect without judicial or
congressional review.' 16 This surely constitutes a "manifest loop-
hole"1 17 in the APPA.
Finally, the Reagan Administration's antitrust enforcement
policy has raised public concerns and controversies similar to
those that existed prior to the passage of the APPA. 8 The An-
114. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 57-58:
[A]Ilowing dismissal without public participation creates a perverse incentive for
the Justice Department to accept no relief at all. While I was not a party to any
of the negotiations that took place over many years between IBM and the Jus-
tice Department, there are sufficient indications in the public press to lead me to
believe that at various times settlement offers were made, involving some forms
of relief, and that IBM would have agreed to undertake some pro-competitive
measures in order [to] conclude the litigation. Yet, that sort of decree would
surely have been subject to the Act. But the Department says that because it
wants to get rid of the IBM case entirely, the APPA requires no public or judi-
cial scrutiny. Surely, it should not be "easier"-i.e., not complying with the
APPA-for the government to obtain no relief rather than to secure some added
public protection. If there are reasons for the government to abandon a suit, it
should have the burden of explaining them in public before the dismissal be-
comes effective, and should not be able to avoid the burden of the APPA en-
tirely by simply dismissing an action.
(statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group).
115. This kind of circumvention occurred in United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche
Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 70 Civ. 2079 (S.D.N.Y.), cited in Branfman, An-
titrust Consent Decrees-A Review and Evaluation of the First Seven Years Under the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303, 349 n.174 (1982). Af-
ter two revisions of a consent decree, in accordance with the judge's suggestions, the
court demanded that the United States take steps to bring the case to trial. The Justice
Department then dismissed the case without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1). Branfman,
supra, at 349. Judge Greene, in the AT&T case, characterized the initial stipulation of
dismissal filed by the parties as a circumvention of the APPA. See supra note 75.
116. This lack of review results because the inherent powers of a court to look for
collusion and the congressional oversight function are the sole restraints on the Antitrust
Division's ability to voluntarily dismiss civil cases. See supra text accompanying notes
53-77.
117. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 948-49: "From the perspective that moved Congress
originally, the Act's failure to protect against dismissals is a manifest loophole."
118. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 1-2 (remarks of Chairman Rodino):
The current administration has certainly not been hesitant about dismissing
cases brought by prior administrations. While such decisions to dismiss major
cases may have been appropriate, or even courageous, there is a significant na-
tional interest in clarifying the procedures to be employed in cases of reversals of
policy with such dramatic consequences. . . . Past experience has demonstrated
that the Department may not be immune from the massive political influence
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titrust Division has been criticized for exceeding the traditional
boundaries of prosecutorial discretion119 and entering into the
realm of economic policymaking.1 0 In addition, the recent IBM
and Mercedes-Benz dismissals have raised a variety of questions
regarding the politicization of the Antitrust Division. In IBM,
despite solid grounds for dismissal, 2 1 the government's trial
staff disagreed with Assistant Attorney General Baxter's deci-
sion to drop the case. 2 Baxter also encountered conflict of in-
that some large antitrust litigants possess.
119. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 950:
If a prosecutor may seek to make the law expand to cover new situations when
he regards that as being in the public interest, why should he not be equally free
to seek to make the law contract? [Because] prosecutorial discretion . . . has to
do with resource allocation decisions and decisions about whether a particular
case can be won or lost-decisions made within the context of conventional
presuppositions about what the law itself requires. Even aggressive prosecutors
seldom attempt to rewrite the law categorically . . . .A prosecutor who simply
stops enforcing those parts of the law which he does not approve faces no [ade-
quate check on his discretion].
120. Id. at 949-50:
The Division [under the Reagan Administration] seems to regard itself primarily
as a policy-making agency-as the maker of antitrust policy for the time being
in office. For example, on the basis of its own economic predictions, it claims
power to decide categorically what parts of the law ought to be enforced and
what parts ought not. . . .My criticism of the Division as it now functions...
[is that] [i]t shows little sense of the limits of its role as the current custodian of
an ongoing tradition. It shows little capacity to resolve questions which, if anti-
trust is to function, ought to be seen not as ideological imperatives, but as mat-
ters of degree. . . .With shifts and starts, the Division for some years has been
moving away from the old conception of its role-that of a law enforcement
agency-toward a new conception-that of a microeconomic policymaker. The
present administration has grasped [this] new role firmly and [has] attempted to
express, across the board and in a consistent manner, the particular economic
policy to which it is politically congenial.
Immediately after the IBM dismissal, Assistant Attorney General Baxter commented
that under his direction, the Division was "backing off" from antitrust policies of the
past. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 34, col. 3.
121. The government faced significant problems with market definition, evidence of
predatory conduct by IBM, and structural relief. See 1982 AT&T Hearings, supra note
108, at 88-95. The IBM case, in Baxter's opinion, was not a case the government "should
win. . .[or] was likely to win, and was one consuming the resources both of IBM and of
the Antitrust Division at a very rapid rate .... " Id. at 128 (testimony of Asst. Att'y
Gen. Baxter).
122. Although meetings with his trial staff were "enormously helpful" to Baxter, id.
at 129-30, he agreed that there were disagreements with his decision. "I was virtually
certain that some number of the trial staff would not agree with my action. I did not poll
the trial staff. I did not ask what their views were on that matter." Id. at 117. One trial
staff attorney who disagreed with the IBM dismissal commented that Baxter had been
critical of the government's strategy and theories. "When you go through so many assis-
tant attorneys general," he said, "you are bound to get one who disagrees with what
you've done." N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 34, col. 2. Baxter refused, however, to permit a
subsequent congressional oversight committee to personally interview members of the
trial staff. See supra note 110.
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terest allegations subsequent to the IBM dismissal. 2 ' In Merce-
des-Benz, Baxter dismissed the case after the government had
proven approximately two-thirds of the allegations in the com-
plaint.1 24 The public reaction to these developments, like the
controversy surrounding the ITT settlement, 2 5 prompted legis-
lative proposals designed to extend the APPA's public interest
provisions to cases of voluntary dismissal.
2
C. Judicial Review of Criminal Antitrust Dismissals Under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a)
In addition to the underlying purposes of the APPA and gen-
eral policy considerations, the judicial review of criminal anti-
trust dismissals under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a)12 7 supports the extension of the APPA to civil antitrust
dismissals. Rule 48(a) requires judicial approval of decisions to
dismiss criminal indictments. 2 8 All criminal cases brought by
the Antitrust 'Division are therefore subject to judicial review
prior to the entry of a dismissal. 129 Of course, certain differences
between criminal and civil cases justify greater restrictions on
the government's ability to dismiss criminal indictments. Be-
cause of the greater degree of "stigma" involved,13 0 judicial re-
view of criminal dismissals focuses primarily on protecting the
123. In the late 1960's, Baxter received a grant from IBM for research, and as a Stan-
ford Law School professor in 1970, he received $1,500 from a law firm defending IBM for
his assistance in evaluating expert witnesses. In 1976, he wrote a letter to the Carter
Administration transition team indicating his opposition to the case. In addition, in the
fall of 1981, while in the process of deciding to dismiss the case, Baxter argued on behalf
of IBM in an antitrust case brought by the European Economic Community. N.Y.
Times, June 18, 1982, at D4, col. 4.
124. See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 65 (statement of Alan B. Morrison,
Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group).
125. See supra note 5.
126. See supra note 23.
127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) provides that "(t)he Attorney General or the United
States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or
complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate."
128. Id. See generally 3A C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 811-12
(1982).
129. See, e.g., United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische In-
dustrie, 75 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neck-
wear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
130. As one commentator has observed, "[wihat distinguishes a criminal from a civil
sanction and all that distinguishes it ... is the judgment of community condemnation
which accompanies and justifies its imposition." Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401. 404 (1958).
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defendant by preventing prosecutorial harassment."3 ' Neverthe-
less, another purpose of Rule 48(a) is to "protect the public in-
terest in the fair administration of criminal justice."'13 More
specifically, the court must examine the sufficiency of the evi-
dence against a defendant 3 s3 and the possibility of prosecutorial
corruption.14 Therefore, the judicial review of criminal antitrust
dismissals under Rule 48(a) focuses, in part, on the public inter-
ests involved in such dismissals."s5 Because the public interests
may be just as great in a civil antitrust action as in a criminal
prosecution," 6 there is no sound reason for distinguishing be-
131. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977)(per curiam): "The principal
object of the 'leave of court' requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against
prosecutorial harrassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Govern-
ment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection." See also 1982
House Hearings, supra note 16, at 44-45 (statement of Deputy Asst. Att'y Gen. Lipsky).
Such abuse of process in civil cases is controlled by the two-dismissal rule of FED. R. Civ.
P. 41(a)(1). See supra note 47.
132. "It seems to us that the history of the Rule belies the notion that its only scope
and purpose is the protection of the defendant . . . [We] think it manifestly clear that
the Supreme Court intended to clothe the federal courts with a discretion broad enough
to protect the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice." United
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Woodruff v.
United States, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). See also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29-30
n.15 (1977): "But the Rule has also been held to permit the court to deny a Government
dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is prompted by
considerations clearly contrary to the public interest." See also United States v. Hamm,
659 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark.
1977).
133. See 3A C. WRIGHT, supra note 128, § 812 n.10 and cases cited therein.
134. "[Rjule 48(a) also provides opportunity for judicial oversight to guard against
prosecutorial corruption or imprudence." Sullivan, supra note 15, at 948.
135. See, e.g., United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische In-
dustrie, 75 F.R.D. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1977):
The indictment in this case alleges a criminal conspiracy which, concerning as it
does an essential lifesaving drug, directly threatens the public weal. The effects
of the alleged conspiracy have been described by the late Senator Hart as "liter-
ally a matter of life and death" .. ..The court finds ... that to allow the
government unilaterally to terminate a nine-year old indictment of the greatest
public significance would be "clearly contrary to [the] manifest public interest."
(footnotes omitted).
136. The government decides to proceed by criminal indictment or by civil action not
on the basis of the public harm involved in a case, but on the basis of the defendant's
conduct. Criminal actions typically arise from instances of outrageous conduct or un-
doubted illegality by the defendant-where the defendant's conduct displays a specific
intent to violate the antitrust laws or where the offense is considered per se illegal. P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST LAW § 309 (1978). Such conduct may arise in cases
involving either tremendous or insignificant impact on the consumer. Horizontal price
fixing is per se illegal, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 218
(1940), and will typically be prosecuted by the Antitrust Division through criminal pro-
ceedings. Yet if the price fixing occurs in a very small industry with little economic im-
pact, the public interests involved will be of no great magnitude. On the other hand,
there are many civil antitrust cases with a significant public impact; the IBM and Merce-
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tween a judicial public interest review in a criminal case and a
similar procedure in a civil case. The similarities between the
two support the application of the APPA's public interest provi-
sions to civil antitrust dismissals.
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IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTENSION OF THE APPA TO
VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS
There are several arguments against applying the APPA to
voluntary dismissals. Certain arguments focus on the added bur-
dens such a proposal would impose upon the Antitrust Division
and the judiciary, and on the potential for circumvention
through the government's refusal to litigate. Other arguments
focus on the constitutional aspects of such an amendment.
A. Resources of the Antitrust Division
Civil antitrust cases voluntarily dismissed by the government
under Rule 41(a)(1) are dismissed without prejudice 13  and may
be reinstituted by a subsequent administration.3 s9 Consent de-
crees, on the other hand, bind both parties4 and are subject
only to modification."" In allocating its limited resources, 42 the
des-Benz cases are two examples. See supra note 22. In addition, all of the merger cases
brought by the Antitrust Division under 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), popularly known as sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, are civil cases because the Clayton Act is an exclusively civil
statute. There have obviously been a number of merger cases in which tremendous pub-
lic interests were at stake. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (General
Motors).
137. One court, in fact, using language similar to that used in the subsequent APPA
legislative history, stated that a district court in a Rule 48(a) motion is not to be a "mere
rubber stamp and must exercise independent discretion." United States v. Bettinger
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 40, 41 (D. Mass. 1971).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1), supra note 47.
139. "[A]s we all know, administrations come and go, and even if, for base political
reasons, one administration leaves corruption undetected and unpunished, the next ad-
ministration can act, not only to punish the malefactor, but to correct his action." Carr,
supra note 15, at 957. Of course, reinstatement of claims previously dismissed by notice
under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) is subject to the "two-dismissal rule." See supra note 47 and ac-
companying text.
140. See supra note 9.
141. The standard for modification of a previously entered consent decree is rigorous.
"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions should lead us to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the
consent of all concerned." United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). The
result has been few modifications of existing decrees. See Note, Construction and Modi-
fication of Antitrust Consent Decrees: New Approaches After the Antitrust Procedures
and Penalties Act of 1974, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 296, 304-05 (1977).
142. "Every executive agency . . . must allocate its resources to promote the public
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Justice Department may wish to occasionally dismiss a case in
order to concentrate its efforts on a higher priority. This flexibil-
ity enhances the public interest by allowing the Antitrust Divi-
sion to focus on priority cases without impairing its ability to
subsequently prosecute dismissed cases. 143 In addition, dismissal
of a government action does not preclude private actions against
a defendant.144 Some argue, therefore, that judicial control over
the resource allocation of the Antitrust Division would impose
unnecessary costs on the government.
45
It is clear, however, that the benefits of judicial review of vol-
untary dismissals would outweigh any costs imposed upon the
Antitrust Division. First, such costs would be less in cases of dis-
missal than in consent decree cases because dismissals are rela-
interest to the maximum possible extent, given the constraints imposed by Congress in
authorizing and appropriating funds." Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 25 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTA-
TOR 155, 182 (1983)(footnote omitted). This duty requires the Antitrust Division to bal-
ance the social costs and benefits of its enforcement activity. Id. at 182-84.
143. "The reasoning [in the APPA's legislative history] was that if a case was dis-
missed without prejudice, it could be reinstituted and vigorously pursued by a later ad-
ministration. That was preferable to an inadequate consent decree that could hinder
subsequent attempts to regulate the defendant's practices." Mercedes-Benz, 547 F.
Supp. at 400-01, (citing 1973 House Hearings, supra note 60, at 43; 1973 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 60, at 76-77). Proponents of a strict public interest standard for judicial
review of consent decrees have advocated the use of this dismissal option to mitigate the
"resource allocation" problems presented by such a standard. See, e.g., Note, Scope of
Judicial Review of Consent Decrees, supra note 13, at 175-76. Cf. supra notes 114-17
and accompanying text (circumvention of APPA procedures through voluntary
dismissal).
144. One commentator states:
The private action remains, and those who believe themselves most severely in-
jured-presumably those who would press most strenuously for judicial reversal
of the prosecutor's judgment-are free, within the rule of standing, to seek reme-
dies themselves. Indeed, the existence of the private action suggests that the
need for judicial review of prosecutorial decisions in antitrust is less than in
many areas of our law in which the enforcement power is confided to the govern-
ment alone.
Carr, supra note 15, at 957. Indeed, "private antitrust litigation is one of the surest
weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965). In fact, a number of seminal
cases in antitrust jurisprudence have been the result of private actions. See, e.g., Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
145. This was actually a major argument raised by the Antitrust Division against the
APPA in 1974. See 119 CONG. REc. 24,601 (1973) (letter of Thomas E. Kauper, Asst.
Att'y General, Antitrust Division, to Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
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tively rare.146 Because the costs of consent decree proceedings
have been minimal,147 the potential cost from dismissal proceed-
ings is insignificant. Second, as the APPA's legislative history
indicates, the question of resource allocation is clearly part of a
court's public interest determination.1 41 If it becomes necessary
to shift resources from one case to another, a reviewing court
will recognize the public interest in doing SO. 1 4 9 The Justice De-
partment itself, on the other hand, may allocate its resources on
the basis of a narrower self-interest in bureaucratic objectives. 6 0
Third, despite the alternative of private enforcement actions,
government actions remain beneficial to the extent they provide
146. Consent decrees represent a dominant percentage of terminated government an-
titrust actions. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
147. The APPA has not forced the Antitrust Division to litigate a larger percentage
of cases or inhibited the Division from initiating claims. Branfman, supra note 115, at
352-53. This is likely due to the deferential standard employed by most courts in review-
ing consent decrees under the APPA. See supra note 13.
148. The public interest includes "compromises made for non-substantive reasons in-
herent in the process of settling cases through the consent decree procedure." 1974 H.R.
REP., supra note 4, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6542. There-
fore, "[tihe court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceed-
ings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settle-
ment through the consent decree process." 119 CONG. REc. 24,598 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Tunney). See also 1973 S. REP., supra note 4, at 6-7.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Assoc.,
228 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which the court was considering a government mo-
tion to dismiss an indictment under Rule 48(a):
Other factors come into play. A trial of ten or more weeks involves a considera-
ble expenditure of effort and money. Apart from the actual period of trial,
months of intensive preparation and the exclusive services of a substantial staff
of attorneys and others would be required. To be sure, the heavy cost of enforce-
ment of law in terms of manpower and money is of no consequence when neces-
sary to insure the integrity of our laws, but needless expenditure of public funds
is not justified.
(footnote omitted). Id. at 489. This Note advocates a judicial public interest standard for
voluntary dismissals that takes into account the Antitrust Division's available resources.
See infra Part V.
150. See Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agen-
cies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private In-
terests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163, 207:
[There is a] bureaucratic tendency to establish a good paper record of enforce-
ment, most easily attainable through numerous court decrees, and sometimes
achieved at the expense of the substance of compliance. [Also], an agency may
be affected with an institutional myopia: its decisions concerning its resource-
allocation, while perhaps rational from a narrow agency perspective, fail to take
into account a broader public interest. This latter possibility is especially likely
where the governing statute may be enforced through private as well as agency
action, and agency attention to all factors, including the potential squandering
of judicial resources through numerous private suits, would dictate a different
result in any given case.
(footnote omitted).
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a collateral estoppel effect for subsequent private actions. 151
Under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 152 a litigated judgment or
decree in favor of the government provides a private plaintiff
with prima facie evidence against a defendant. s53 Finally, despite
the Justice Department's claim to the contrary, 54 judicial con-
trol over the power of dismissal is not tantamount to control
over the power to initiate actions. The filing of a complaint is a
significant act representing a major commitment of resources. 55
Judicial review over the Antitrust Division's power to reverse
that commitment therefore differs from control over the govern-
ment's investigatory power.5' A judicial public interest review in
cases of voluntary dismissal would not impair the Antitrust Di-
vision's ability to allocate its substantial pre-litigation
resources.1
5 7
151. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1982) provides in part:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or crimi-
nal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust
laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws, as to all matters respecting
which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties
thereto ....
The issues raised by the application of this provision are discussed in P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 324 (1978).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1982).
153. Id.
154. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 88: "A decision to dismiss a case ... is
thus tantamount to a decision not to bring a case at all." Id. (Justice Department's anal-
ysis of H.R. 6361).
155.
The filing of a complaint is a significant act requiring a major decision by at
least the head of the Antitrust Division, and often by higher officials in the De-
partment of Justice. The filing of a complaint in the federal court is hardly an
insignificant act: it tolls the statute of limitations; causes the defendants to for-
mally gear up for actual litigation; and requires the courts to allocate resources
to handle the case.
1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 58 (statement of Alan B. Morrison, Director,
Public Citizen Litigation Group).
156. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 947-48:
[O]nce an action has been brought, a Division claim of need for untrammeled
discretion is vastly weaker than it would be at the pre-litigation stage. Once the
Division has brought an action, the range of questions that must be dealt with
are [sic] much narrower than those about resources and priorities that were
faced earlier. The investigation has been completed, the imponderables evalu-
ated, the resource commitment made. The remaining questions are convention-
ally judicial in nature.
157. "[D]ecisions to dismiss cases are relatively rare compared with pre-complaint
decisions not to institute investigations or to terminate investigations without prosecu-
tion." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 88 n.2 (Justice Department's analysis of
H.R. 6361).
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B. Resources and Impartiality of the Judiciary
Similar arguments exist with respect to the added burdens po-
tentially imposed upon the federal courts. Judges typically lack
expertise in antitrust law, s15  and requiring a public interest as-
sessment of the facts of a case prior to their full development at
trial would exacerbate this problem. 159 Yet judges should be
more qualified to review dismissal proposals than settlement
proposals. The question of whether sufficient evidence exists to
bring a case to trial 60 is more suited for judicial resolution than
is the question of whether a consent decree provides an ade-
quate remedy. 6 ' In addition, the APPA provisions for expert
testimony and amicus curiae intervention6 ' ensure the availabil-
ity of requisite information for a court's public interest
determination.
The more troublesome problem of a judge's impartiality in
later proceedings could arise following a refusal to enter a stipu-
lation of dismissal. Some have argued that such a refusal would
destroy the subsequent impartiality of the tribunal.16 3 Absent a
showing of personal bias or prejudice,'" however, participation
158. "[A]ntitrust litigation is very complex litigation. Most Federal judges serve a
lifetime on the bench without trying one [antitrust] case and, consequently, they are
really ignorant of the issues and even the law, to some extent, involved in antitrust
cases." 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 60, at 151 (testimony of Judge Skelly Wright).
159. "[T]he court, in assessing the public interest in light of collateral factors, will
have to gauge the necessity of the relief in view of the available alternatives and their
effects, both on the plaintiff's and the defendant's interests, and on the interests of
others. And this is a kind of judgment that, on occasion, the court may feel unable to
make without the full elucidation provided by trial." Carr, supra note 15, at 959. Indeed,
"courts may feel reluctant to make the determinations ... without at least some signifi-
cant factual and legal reassurances." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 90 (Justice
Department's analysis of H.R. 6361).
160. This is a major focus of judicial review of criminal dismissals under Rule 48(a).
See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Sufficiency of the evidence should also be a
primary focus of review of civil dismissals under an amended APPA. See infra Part V.
161. This is the primary focus of judicial review of consent decrees under the APPA.
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 12.
163. See 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 37 (statement of Deputy Asst. Att'y
Gen. Lipsky):
The integrity of the judicial process . . . requires that decisions by prosecutor
and judge be independent of one another. Certainly, all would agree that a pros-
ecutor placed on the bench should have nothing to do with decisions in cases
that he instituted. Yet I think that requiring courts to second-guess a
prosecutorial decision to dismiss a case would create an uncomfortably similar
situation.
See also id. at 46 (exchange between Mr. Polk and Mr. Lipsky).
164. The federal recusal statute provides in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
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in previous hearings will not disqualify a judge from presiding
over a case.l 6e Adverse rulings against a party in earlier hearings
are also insufficient for disqualification. 66 Most significantly, the
apparent lack of complaints of judicial bias following refusals to
enter criminal dismissals under Rule 48(a)167 suggests that a
similar procedure in civil antitrust actions would not create
problems of bias. If such problems did arise, of course, a judge
could be replaced under the federal recusal statute. 6 8
C. Failure to Litigate and Potential Circumvention
Another problem that might arise following a judge's refusal
to enter a stipulation of dismissal is the government's refusal to
continue the litigation. The separation of powers doctrine 6 9 dic-
tates that a judge cannot compel the Antitrust Division to liti-
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party,
such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned
to hear such proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982)(emphasis added). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982), which requires a
judge to disqualify himself where, inter alia, "he has a personal bias or prejudice con-
cerning a party." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). These statutes "use
similar language, and are intended to govern the same area of conduct, they have been
construed in pari materia, and the test of the legal sufficiency of a motion for disqualifi-
cation is the same under both statutes." United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889 (1st
Cir. 1983). See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958, 965
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
165. "The Supreme Court has held, 'The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualify-
ing must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge has learned from his participation in the case.'" In
re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). See also United States v.
Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889 (Ist Cir. 1983); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 614 F.2d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 1980).
166. "[W]e cannot agree that adverse rulings by a judge can per se create the appear-
ance of bias under section 455(a). A trial judge must be free to make rulings on the
merits without the apprehension that if he makes a disproportionate number in favor of
one litigant, he may have created the impression of bias." In re International Business
Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d
1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d
958, 964-66 (5th Cir. 1980).
167. No such disqualification motions following denials of Rule 48(a) motions to dis-
miss appear in the annotations to 28 U.S.C.A. § 144 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985), 28
U.S.C.A. § 455 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985), or FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a)(West 1976 & Supp.
1985). See also LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file, (28 w/6 144) AND Rule 48(a); (28 w/6
455) AND Rule 48(a).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982), supra note 164. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982), supra note
164.
169. For a discussion of the separation of powers issues arising from a judge's initial
ruling on a dismissal motion, see infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text.
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gate a case. 170 The judicial refusal to enter a voluntary dismissal
could thus be circumvented by the Antitrust Division through a
refusal to litigate followed by a Rule 41(b) involuntary
dismissal.
171
It is unlikely, however, that such circumvention would occur
under an amended APPA. Subsequent to a judge's refusal to
dismiss a case, the Antitrust Division would probably obey the
judicial order and continue the litigation. 72 Yet assuming the
Justice Department did refuse to litigate, the case could still be
pursued by outside counsel-appointed either by the court1 73 or
170. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n,
228 F. Supp. 483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Although the court approved the government's
application to dismiss under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a), it stated that when such motions are
dismissed, courts are "without power to issue a mandamus or other order to compel pros-
ecution of the indictment, since such a direction would invade the traditional separation
of powers doctrine." Id. at 489. (footnote omitted).
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) reads in part: "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against him." The standard for a Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal
is a "clear record of delay or contumacious conduct" by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Martin-
Trigona v. Morris, 627 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1980); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Box
ing and Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1039 (1972). See generally 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 46, § 2369 n.70-71 and
accompanying text. Assuming that the government could meet this standard by refusing
to litigate following denial of a motion for dismissal, the defendant could successfully
move for dismissal under Rule 41(b). Alternatively, the court could dismiss the action for
want of prosecution without a motion from the defendant. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 629-32 (1926).
172. "[Ilt is the Assistant Attorney General's responsibility under the law to take the
instruction from the judge and carry it forward in a professional manner . . . [and] I
think, for example, if Mr. Baxter were instructed to go back to court and litigate [a] case
that he would ... " 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 22 (testimony of Sen.
Arlen Specter). See also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 948:
[T]here is no more reason to fear a judicial-executive confrontation upon judicial
oversight of dismissals than upon judicial oversight of consent decrees. As Pro-
fessor Goldstein has said, judges are not eager to appoint special prosecutors,
nor are government attorneys eager to do battle with judges. In the routine case,
the judge will be obeyed.
This is also the opinion of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division between 1972-76. Interview with Thomas E. Kauper, Professor, University of
Michigan Law School, in Ann Arbor (Feb. 6, 1985). At least in the IBM litigation, such a
response would not have been barred by problems of unenthusiastic counsel; the govern-
ment trial staff disagreed with Baxter's decision to dismiss the case. See supra note 122.
173. "If the Assistant Attorney General does not [continue litigating upon judicial
instruction to do so], special counsel can be appointed. . . courts have inherent author-
ity [to do so]." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 22 (testimony of Sen. Arlen
Specter). In his 1982 congressional testimony, Sen. Specter noted a law review comment
that he authored in 1955 supporting the appointment of private counsel by courts in
order to continue prosecutions. The authority for such judicial appointments derives
from either state statute or the "inherent powers" of a court to prevent injustice. See
Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwarranted Inac-
tion, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 216-17 (1955). At least one federal court has exercised this inher-
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by the Antitrust Division itself.'74 Either voluntary compliance
by the Justice Department or the appointment of outside coun-
sel will eliminate the potential for circumvention under an
amended APPA.
D. Constitutional Objections to Extension of the APPA
The primary objection to amending the APPA in order to ap-
ply its public interest provisions to voluntary dismissals is that
such an amendment would be unconstitutional. 175 This argu-
ment focuses upon two different considerations: the separation
of powers between the executive and judicial branches of gov-
ernment, and the case or controversy requirement of Article III.
1. Separation of powers- The power to enforce the anti-
trust laws is vested in the Attorney General, 176 an executive of-
ficer, and this power is necessarily broad.177 This power includes
the discretion to investigate possible antitrust violations178 and
to file civil or criminal actions.17 9 Prosecutorial discretion also
includes, some argue, the power to terminate an antitrust action
through voluntary dismissal. 80 Judicial review of executive deci-
ent authority to appoint outside counsel. In United States v. Cowan, 381 F. Supp. 214
(N.D. Tex. 1974), following the court's rejection of a government Rule 48(a) motion, the
U.S. attorney filed notice of his intention not to prosecute. The court then appointed
special prosecutors with full authority to control the subsequent litigation. United States
v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1975).
174. Former Assistant Attorney General Baxter has admitted that "contracting out"
at least the lead trial role to private sector attorneys is a possibility for the Antitrust
Division. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 120.
175. Both the IBM and Mercedes-Benz courts noted potential constitutional
problems in applying the APPA to voluntary dismissals, but neither court specifically
dealt with these problems. IBM, 687 F.2d at 602; Mercedes-Benz, 547 F. Supp. at 401.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
177. "The antitrust laws in particular are worded in very general terms; necessarily,
substantial prosecutorial discretion must be exercised .... " 1982 House Hearings,
supra note 16, at 88 (Justice Department's analysis of H.R. 6361).
178. "Tradition leaves the Division free of judicial oversight in the administration of
the antitrust laws at least up until the point when a suit has been filed." Sullivan, supra
note 15, at 944. As a result, the Antitrust Division exercises "substantial prosecutorial
discretion ... in deciding what matters to investigate .... " 1982 House Hearings,
supra note 16, at 88 (Justice Department's analysis of H.R. 6361).
179. "[Tjhe decision [to initiate an antitrust action] rests in the sole discretion of the
Attorney General." Parker v. Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(footnote
omitted). See also Baxter, supra note 142, at 175: "[I]t is clear that the Antitrust Divi-
sion as an organ of the executive branch has considerable discretion in the selection of
cases to prosecute .... "
180. "Whether or when to dismiss an enforcement action is and should be regarded
as a prosecutorial rather than a judicial decision." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16,
at 88 (Justice Department's analysis of H.R. 6361). "In short, whether or when any Gov-
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sions to dismiss antitrust actions may therefore violate the tradi-
tional separation of powers between the three branches of
government."'8
The separation of powers doctrine, however, requires some-
thing less than "a complete division of authority between the
three branches [of government]. 1 8 2 In Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services,"'3 the Supreme Court declared a two-part
test. First, an act of Congress must not unduly "[prevent] the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions."1 8' Second, if the potential for such infringe-
ment exists, it must then be determined "whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress. '" 8 Analysis of the APPA's
public interest provisions and their application to voluntary dis-
missals shows that such an application would not violate these
two parts of the separation of powers test.
First, a judicial public interest review of voluntary dismissals
would not prevent the Antitrust Division from performing its
function of enforcing the antitrust laws. Judicial review of deci-
sions to dismiss would leave the Antitrust Division with a great
degree of prosecutorial discretion in further litigation.18 6 In addi-
tion, a judicial order to continue litigation in a case would not
unduly strain the enforcement resources required for the prose-
ernment antitrust case should be terminated is a prosecutorial decision. It belongs to the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General should be held solely accountable for it."
1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 37 (statement of Asst. Att'y Gen. Lipsky). More
specifically, it has been argued that prosecutorial discretion includes determining the
public interest grounds for a voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 15, at 956-
57:
In short, in the context of voluntary dismissals, judicial application of the public
interest standard, if it means anything, necessarily amounts to a collateral pro-
ceeding to review the exercise of prosecutorial judgment, to a kind of mandamus
action presumably meant to compel, in some circumstances, continued prosecu-
tion. It is a kind of proceeding that, to my knowledge, is utterly foreign to the
federal jurisdiction, and for a very good reason: it runs squarely counter to sepa-
ration of powers principles clear in the Constitution itself and repeatedly af-
firmed by the Supreme Court.
181. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803). "The clear separa-
tion of prosecutor and judge is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system, and
judicial participation in prosecutorial decisions would be inconsistent with this princi-
ple." 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 89 (Justice Department's analysis of H.R.
6361). See generally McDavid, supra note 15, at 911-13.
182. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
183. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
184. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)).
185. 433 U.S. 425, 443. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-24 (1976).
186. For example, the Antitrust Division could choose between continuing the litiga-
tion on a different theory, attempting to settle the case via consent decree, or attempting
another voluntary dismissal at a later date.
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cution of other cases.18 7 Voluntary dismissals constitute a small
percentage of terminated government antitrust suits, whereas
consent decrees constitute a large percentage.18 8 Judicial review
of the dismissal process is therefore less of a potential infringe-
ment on the Antitrust Division than is the current judicial re-
view of the settlement process. Because the existing APPA pro-
cedures have not significantly infringed on the Antitrust
Division's ability to successfully litigate or settle cases,' similar
procedures in dismissal cases would not impose significant bur-
dens on the Antitrust Division.
The existing APPA judicial review procedures have been up-
held on constitutional grounds. 190 In Maryland v. United
States,"' the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the consent
decree in the AT&T divestiture. Three Justices dissented,9 2 as-
serting that Judge Greene's public interest review violated the
separation of powers doctrine.' 3 The majority, however, ratified
the APPA's public interest provisions. Judicial review of consent
decree settlements is therefore valid.' 9 ' Again, because judicial
review of voluntary dismissals would impose a lesser infringe-
187. See supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 147.
190. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
191. Id.
192. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice'Burger and Justice White, dissented
from the summary affirmance. 460 U.S. at 1001-06.
193.
The question whether to prosecute a lawsuit is a question of the execution of the
laws, which is committed to the Executive by Art. II. There is no standard by
which the benefits to the public from a "better" settlement of a -lawsuit than the
Justice Department has negotiated can be balanced against the risk of an ad-
verse decision, the need for a speedy resolution of the case, the benefits obtained
in the settlement, and the availability of the Department's resources for other
cases. How is a court to decide whether a better settlement in a case involving
one industry is more important to the public than the benefits that might be
gained by immediately working on an antitrust problem in another industry?
Finally, the decision requires an evaluation of an initial policy deci-
sion-whether the benefits that might be obtained in a lawsuit are worth the
risks and costs-that is clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
460 U.S. at 1006. Questions concerning the validity of a judicial public interest determi-
nation also appear in the APPA's legislative history. See, e.g., 1974 H.R. REP., supra note
4, at 21-22, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6545-46 (additional views
of Rep. Hutchinson).
194. Although the Justice Department initially opposed the APPA, in part on consti-
tutional grounds, see 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 60, at 91-92 (statement of Asst.
Att'y Gen. Kauper), the Antitrust Division today "does not question the constitutional-
ity of the Tunney Act when construed literally to limit oversight to instances where the
Division settles by consent decree." Sullivan, supra note 15, at 946.
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ment on the Antitrust Division,"9 5 an amended APPA applying
to dismissals should also be found constitutionally valid.
Second, assuming the potential for disruption of the Antitrust
Division's enforcement activity exists, this impact could be justi-
fied by the overriding importance of protecting the public inter-
est in antitrust enforcement procedures. As the APPA's legisla-
tive history indicates, vital public interest concerns are inherent
in government antitrust suits.196 These concerns are as signifi-
cant in cases of voluntary dismissal as in cases of consent decree
settlement.19 7 Protection of the public interest is just as much an
"overriding need"198 in dismissals as in settlements. Thus, the
fact that the APPA is constitutionally valid is again strong evi-
dence that applying the Act to voluntary dismissals would also
be constitutional. Similar to the judicial review of consent de-
crees, judicial review of voluntary dismissals would meet both
parts of the separation of powers test set forth in Nixon. 99
In addition to these general standards, Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 48(a) specifically demonstrates the validity of ju-
dicial review of executive decisions to dismiss cases. Rule 48(a)
requires judicial approval of decisions to dismiss criminal indict-
ments 00 and has been upheld by several courts on constitutional
grounds.20' It does not violate the separation of powers doc-
trine.02 As previously noted, differences between criminal and
195. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973)(remarks of Sen. Tunney). See also Merce-
des-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 399, 400 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (mem.): "[A] court's
[inherent] power is appropriately exercised where the action is one imbued with the pub-
lic interest. Government-initiated antitrust suits are of a public nature."
197. See supra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
198. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
199. See id. See also Sullivan, supra note 15, at 947:
However, separation of powers does not involve looking only at the interest of
the executive and the interest of the courts. A process of triangulation is in-
volved. One must consider also the interest of Congress. Tunney Act procedures
are not directed merely at seeing whether decree supervision will be unduly bur-
densome to the court. . . . Rather, [they respond] to the congressional concern
that the Division might settle cases badly. The court must determine whether
the settlement is in the public interest. As to this matter, the distinction be-
tween a consent decree and a consent dismissal-significant perhaps for other
purposes-becomes a mere matter of form. The congressional interest is as great
whether the settlement is executed by a consent dismissal or a consent decree.
200. See supra note 127.
201. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Has-
tings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark. 1977); United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combina-
tie Voor Chemische Industrie, 75 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Greater
Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
202. "The effect of Rule 48(a) necessarily turns what was once solely the prerogative
of the executive into a shared responsibility between the executive and judicial branches
of government. . . . The government's contention that the court is constitutionally con-
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civil cases probably justify a greater degree of judicial involve-
ment in criminal dismissals. 0 3 The similarities, however, justify
a judicial review procedure similar to Rule 48(a) in civil anti-
trust dismissals.2' Because Rule 48(a) does not violate the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, a comparable procedure in civil anti-
trust dismissals should also be valid.
20 5
2. Case or controversy requirement- The case or contro-
versy requirement of Article 111206 restricts the scope of justicia-
ble questions to those presenting a substantial conflict between
two adversaries.20 7 Without a "definite and concrete '208 dispute,
no case or controversy exists requiring judicial resolution. Those
opposing the application of the APPA to voluntary dismissals
assert that when the Antitrust Division dismisses a complaint
against a defendant, no substantial controversy exists between
the parties and judicial review of the dismissal constitutes an
advisory opinion.09 Because the case or controversy requirement
strained to grant leave to dismiss the indictment is without merit." United States v. N.V.
Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 75 F.R.D. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). In fact, one court concluded that Rule 48(a) did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine in light of the Nixon case:
That authoritative reasoning should be our guide here. We think the rule should
and can be construed to preserve the essential judicial function of protecting the
public interest in the evenhanded administration of criminal justice without en-
croaching on the primary duty of the Executive to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.
United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975).
203. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
205. "These thoughtful observations strongly suggest to me that either legislation or
an amendment of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to contain provisions
on the civil side parallel to those contained in Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, would be constitutionally valid." Lasker, supra note 15, at 942 (citing
United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975)).
206. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to controversies between two or more States;- . ...
207. "The basic inquiry is whether the 'conflicting contentions of the parties . . .
present a real, substantial controversy between the parties having adverse legal interests,
a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.'" Babbitt v. Farm Workers,
442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)(citations omitted). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95
(1968): Justiciability limits "the business of federal courts to questions presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process."
208. Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979).
209. McDavid, supra note 15, at 913-14: "Once the complaint has been dismissed,
there is no longer a real or substantial controversy presented in an adversary context.
The continuation of the litigation in a non-adversary form would involve an advisory
opinion."
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limits the congressional power to control federal court jurisdic-
tion,"' some argue that amending the APPA to require a judi-
cial public interest review prior to the entry of a stipulation of
dismissal would be unconstitutional.
Like the separation of powers doctrine, however, the case or
controversy requirement is a flexible principle not "susceptible
to scientific verification." 1' Questions of justiciability involve




The strong policy considerations in favor of increasing the judi-
cial role in voluntary dismissals "1 are therefore relevant and
support the constitutionality of an amended APPA applying to
dismissals.
The flexibility of the case or controversy requirement is ap-
parent in both civil and criminal dismissals. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) 21 4 demonstrates the limitations on a
plaintiff's ability to dismiss a case without the order of a court.
Rule 23(e),2 15 Rule 66,216 and two statutory exemptions217 to
Rule 41(a)(1) all empower courts with continuing jurisdiction
subsequent to a plaintiff's dismissal of charges against a defend-
ant. These provisions protect the parties and- the public from
unjust dismissals.1 Courts have found these limitations on
210. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3526
(1984). Congress cannot, therefore, grant jurisdiction over moot cases or advisory
opinions.
211. "Justiciability is ... not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible to
scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures ... " Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
212. "Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope . . . [particu-
larly because it] has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considera-
tions." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95-97 (1968).
213. See generally supra Part III.
214. See supra note 14.
215. See supra note 49.
216. See supra note 50.
217. See supra note 52.
218. "The purposes of Rule 23(e) are to discourage the use of the class action device
to secure an unjust private settlement, and to protect the absent class members against
prejudice from discontinuance." Larkin Gen. Hosp. Ltd. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 93
F.R.D. 497, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(citing 3 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 4910, at 402
(1977)). Rule 23(e) is thus designed to protect other plaintiffs' interests in the litigation.
See also 1982 House Hearings, supra note 16, at 45-46 (statement of Asst. Att'y Gen.
Lipsky). The purpose of Rule 66's requirement of judicial approval of dismissals is to
protect the court's investment of time and effort in administering the property involved
in a case. 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC'ICE & PROCEDURE § 2981 (1973).
The provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)(1982), supra note 52, are "intended to discour-
age the repeated bringing of suits which are without merit but which might be brought
merely to satisfy complainant's . . . desire for revenge, and also to discourage private
compromise settlements." United States ex. rel. Laughlin v. Eicher, 56 F. Supp. 972, 973
(D.D.C. 1944).
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plaintiffs and these extensions of judicial authority to be consti-
tutional."9 In addition, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a)220 provides a judicial review procedure in criminal cases
that has also been upheld.221  Therefore, despite prohibitions
against ruling on the merits of a dismissed case,222 there are few
limitations on a court's ability to rule solely on questions con-
cerning the public interests in maintaining an action. Applying
the APPA's public interest provisions to voluntary dismissals
would not violate the case or controversy requirement.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE APPA
A BILL
To amend the Clayton Act to require judicial approval
of voluntary dismissals in cases brought by or on be-
half of the United States under the antitrust laws.
SEC. 1. Section 5(b)-(g) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 16(b)-(g)(1982)) is amended by striking out "consent
judgment" and "judgment" and inserting in lieu thereof
"consent judgment or voluntary dismissal".
SEC. 2. Section 5(e) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §
16(e)(1982)) is amended-
(1) by striking "For the" and all that follows through
219. Rule 23(e)'s provision for judicial approval of voluntary dismissals was upheld in
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 727, 736-37 (N.D. Ill. 1977)(citing
Supreme Court's implicit holding of same in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974)). 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1982), supra note 52, was upheld in Halbach v. Markham, 106
F. Supp. 475, 480 (D.N.J. 1952), aff'd, 207 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
933 (1954). Rule 66, supra note 50, and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)(1982), supra note 52, have
apparently not been challenged.
220. See supra note 127.
221. See supra note 201.
222. This is the crux of the case or controversy requirement. See, e.g., 13A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3533.2 (1982):
"Mootness problems arise from a wide array of circumstances in which the plaintiff has
secured the requested relief by some means other than final decision of the litigation, or
has abandoned the quest .... The common qdstion in all of these cases is whether any
need remains to decide the merits." (emphasis added). Because the APPA public inter-
est provisions should not require a judicial determination of the merits of a dismissed
case, but only a consideration of the sufficiency of evidence against a defendant, see infra
Part V, the case or controversy objections are not directly relevant.
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"may consider-", and inserting in lieu thereof "For the
purpose of such a determination in the entering of a
consent judgment, the court may consider-".
(2) by inserting after subsection (e)(2) the following
paragraph:
"For the purpose of such a determination in the en-
tering of a voluntary dismissal, the court may consider
the sufficiency of evidence against the defendant, the
available enforcement resources of the government,
and the overall public impact of the defendant's al-
leged antitrust violations."
Comment
Because the rationale for judicial review of voluntary dismis-
sals reflects the purposes underlying judicial review provisions of
the APPA and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), 22 the
judicial review standard under an amended APPA applying to
dismissals should resemble both of these provisions. Similar to
the Rule 48(a) standard, the sufficiency of evidence against a de-
fendant should be a primary consideration.2 2 If sufficient evi-
dence exists to proceed to trial, the public interest should nor-
mally require the rejection of a proposed dismissal. But this
should not be the sole factor. A reviewing court should also
weigh the enforcement resources of the Antitrust Division
225
against the overall importance of the case to the public. 22 These
three factors reflect all affected interests: those of the defendant,
the government, and the public.227 Section 16(f) 228 should be ap-
plied to dismissals as it is to consent decrees in order to provide
courts with sufficient information concerning these relevant fac-
tors. The propriety of applying other APPA provisions to volun-
223. See supra notes 79-106, 127-37 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
226. The overall public importance of the case should be defined in terms of harm to
the public resulting from the defendant's alleged antitrust violations.
227. This three-factor approach is similar to the approach of Judge Edelstein in
United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 428 F.
Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In a Rule 48(a) motion for entry of dismissal, the government
did not contest the sufficiency of evidence against the defendant. In denying the govern-
ment's motion, however, the court did not rest solely on this ground. The court also
discussed the public impact of the defendant's antitrust violations and the public ex-
pense involved in continuing the litigation. Id. at 116-17.
228. See supra note 12.
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tary dismissals is not directly considered by this amendment. 229
Legislation substantially similar to this amendment was intro-
duced by Representative Peter W. Rodino (D-New Jersey) in
both the 97th and 98th Congresses. 23 0 Both the 1982 bill and the
1983 bill would have applied the APPA public interest provi-
sions to voluntary dismissals as well as to consent decree propos-
als.2 31 Both bills proposed a stringent public interest standard
for dismissals, requiring a district court to enter a stipulation of
dismissal unless "there is substantial reason to believe that the
United States would prevail on the merits of any of the claims in
[the] action. 2 s3 2 Yet if the court did refuse to enter the stipula-
tion, both bills preserved the Attorney General's final authority
to enter the dismissal subsequent to filing a reevaluation state-
ment.233 These provisions apparently reflect constitutional con-
cerns regarding the proposal.
234
The proposed amendment thus differs from these bills in two
significant respects. First, the three factor public interest stan-
dard focuses on more than the sufficiency of evidence against a
defendant and the government's chances of prevailing on any
claim in the action. Instead, the gravity of the defendant's al-
leged violations and the strain on the Antitrust Division's re-
sources from proceeding with the litigation are also consid-
ered.235 Second, the proposed amendment mandates judicial
229. Other APPA provisions are considered only to the extent that "consent judg-
ment" is replaced with "consent judgment or voluntary dismissal." This change provides
for the general applicability of the Act to voluntary dismissals.
230. See supra note 23. These bills were never adopted.
231. "Any proposed stipulation submitted by the United States for entry to termi-
nate any civil action . . . under the antitrust laws shall be filed with the district court
before which such action is pending. . . ." H.R. 2244, supra note 23, at 872 (emphasis
added); H.R. 6361, supra note 23, at 4-5 (emphasis added).
232. H.R. 2244, supra note 23, at 876; H.R. 6361, supra note 23, at 8. Such a stan-
dard reflects a narrow focus on the sufficiency of evidence against a defendant, and
would apparently require the government to continue litigating in pursuit of insignificant
claims, irrespective of the resulting costs.
233. [If the court finds that the entry of the stipulation of dismissal is against the
public interest],
the district court shall order the Attorney General to reevaluate the substance of
the stipulation and to file a statement describing the results of the reevaluation
.... If the Attorney General determines that the United States will not request
the withdrawal of the stipulation ... then the district court shall enter the
stipulation.
H.R. 2244, supra note 23, at 878; H.R. 6361, supra note 23, at 11.
234. The constitutional arguments regarding judicial review of voluntary dismissals
are examined supra notes 175-222 and accompanying text.
235. Proposed Amendment, Sec. 2(2). This language would also avoid potential
problems with the word "any" in H.R. 2244 and H.R. 6361. Both bills seemed to man-
date the continuance of a suit if the government has a good chance of winning a trivial
claim in the action, regardless of the resulting resource costs.
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approval prior to the entry of a stipulation of dismissal. Under
the 1982 and 1983 bills, the Attorney General retained the con-
stitutional authority to dismiss an antitrust action despite a
judge's objections. Because a mandatory judicial approval provi-
sion would be constitutional 3 1 this retention of executive power
is unnecessary. 7
CONCLUSION
The APPA does not currently apply to voluntary dismissals of
civil antitrust actions. Congress intended to limit the Act to con-
sent decree settlements. This is apparent from the language of
the statute itself, its legislative history, and recent case law in-
terpretation. Nevertheless, applying the APPA to voluntary dis-
missals would be consistent with the underlying purposes and
policy of the APPA and with the judicial review of criminal anti-
trust dismissals under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a).
Congress should therefore amend the APPA to require a judicial
public interest determination prior to the entry of a voluntary
dismissal in public, civil antitrust actions. Judicial review should
focus upon the sufficiency of evidence against a defendant, the
available enforcement resources of the Antitrust Division, and
the overall public impact of the defendant's alleged antitrust vi-
olations. Such an amendment would not unduly strain the re-
sources of the Antitrust Division or the judiciary. Despite consti-
tutional objections, such an amendment would not violate either
the separation of powers doctrine or the case or controversy
requirement.
-Jon B. Jacobs
236. See supra notes 175-222 and accompanying text.
237. Retention of executive power to dismiss a case would also be undesirable be-
cause it would create problems of potential circumvention of the Act's judicial public
interest provisions.
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